Global trade patterns are changing without collapsing. That is the argument of Zhao Zhongxiu, president of the University of International Business and Economics, who told China Daily that globalisation is not ending but being reconfigured around resilience, sustainability and strategic security. His view captures important economic trends, yet it understates the depth of political fracture shaping world affairs in 2026.
Reconfigured globalisation meets political drift
On the economic data, Zhao is persuasive. Nearly half of world trade still occurs inside global value chains. Services now contribute more value added than goods. Middle‑income economies such as Vietnam, Mexico, Poland and Turkey are emerging as connectors. China produced roughly 77 per cent of the world’s electric vehicles in 2023. Sectoral agreements on data flows, critical minerals and the energy transition are proliferating. These developments point to adaptation, not collapse, of international commerce.
Yet the institutional and political environment that supported the expansion of value chains since the 1990s has eroded. The World Trade Organization remains hamstrung. Multilateral decision making suffers repeated blockages. International cooperation has given way to ad hoc and often asymmetric deals. Reconfiguration therefore proceeds without a credible normative centre and without effective collective coordination. That gap transforms economic adjustment into potential strategic instability.
China’s rise illustrates the tension. Beijing couples outward integration with a strong domestic industrial strategy. Public financing, long‑term planning and targeted support have helped the country move up the value chain in areas such as electric vehicles, intermediate semiconductors, logistics and green infrastructure. That technological and industrial advance expands Chinese influence in production networks, yet it also intensifies geopolitical frictions with a United States that increasingly treats interdependence as a strategic risk.
Consequently, economic decisions are often securitised. Sanctions, export controls, technology restrictions, targeted subsidies and friend‑shoring have become routine instruments of statecraft. Where trade once reflected comparative advantage, policy now reflects national security calculations. That dynamic makes supply chains more resilient on paper but more brittle in political terms.
For countries in the Global South, the new environment is double edged. Fragmentation can create space for new linkages and partners, but without coherent industrial policy, adequate financing and institutional capacity the result may be fresh forms of dependency. The Chinese experience suggests that successful integration requires a clear national strategy, public investment and the capacity to defend technological sovereignty.
The key paradox is that globalisation can grow more functional while the international order grows more dysfunctional. Production networks can digitalise, decarbonise and gain efficiency at the same time as political cooperation declines, conflicts persist and multilateral rules weaken. That divergence means the reconfigured globalisation described by Zhao will be uneven, contested and fragile unless accompanied by renewed political arrangements for governance and crisis management.
Policymakers should therefore treat industrial policy and trade strategy as inseparable from diplomatic and institutional work. Without credible mechanisms for cooperation, the efficiency gains of reorganised supply chains risk being offset by strategic competition, exclusionary blocs and deeper inequalities. The future of globalisation in 2026 looks less like a smooth transition and more like a patchwork of economic rationalities navigating a world without a common political compass.
Key Takeaways:
- China remains central to the reconfigured globalisation as value chains adapt for resilience and sustainability.
- Economic reorganisation occurs while global governance weakens, raising political and security risks.
- Industrial policy and state capacity determine which countries benefit from new supply chains.
- Developing economies face opportunity and vulnerability unless they pursue deliberate industrial and investment strategies.
